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CIA LATE ITEM

POLAND: Death of Cardinal Wyszynski

The death today of Cardinal Wyszynski will usher in a period of mourning in which political controversies will be temporarily shelved and will open up discussion within the Church leadership about its future role.

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During his 30-plus years as head of Poland's powerful and embattled Catholic Church, Wyszynski exercised great moral authority over the population as well as strict control over the [redacted] bishops. He used his personal prestige as a moderating force both on the regime as well as on the disgruntled Polish population. His influence was particularly critical during the tumultuous past 10 months. [redacted]

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The selection of a successor will involve behind-the-scenes discussions between the Polish Episcopate, the Vatican, and the regime. Archbishop Macharski from Krakow is a leading candidate, and there are several prominent bishops and many dark horses who could be compromise choices. [redacted]

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The regime, technically, has a veto power over Church appointments. In light of its current weakened condition and need for Church support, it will probably go along with the Church's candidate. It would only exercise its veto power if one of the more radical bishops were nominated. [redacted]

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No matter who succeeds Wyszynski, the Church will continue to act as a moderating force. Maintaining unity within the Church leadership will be more difficult, however, without the authoritarian rule of Wyszynski. Some Polish bishops are known to favor more active support of Solidarity and have privately criticized Wyszynski's cautious and conciliatory policies. In the past, such differences were submerged by the need to maintain Church unity against the regime. In a more pluralistic, democratic Poland, however, some bishops might begin to act more independently. [redacted]

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


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
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
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Syrian Ground Forces in Lebanon



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
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LEBANON: Syrian Military Activity

Syria has moved a tank battalion into Lebanon and may be planning to send elements of a mechanized infantry brigade and an artillery regiment there shortly.



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 the US attache in Beirut claims the Syrians also may have sent other tanks from this brigade to reinforce small Syrian units stationed in the southern Bekaa Valley. The 91st has been assigned to the border area since early May, and its mechanized battalion has been near the SA-6 sites at Zahlah for several weeks. 

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The defense attache in Damascus yesterday saw elements of Syria's 58th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and an artillery regiment preparing to move toward Lebanon. The new military activity in Lebanon may be meant to demonstrate Syrian resolve. 

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New Arab Initiatives

Arab Foreign Ministers meeting in Tunis last weekend requested that the Saudi and Kuwaiti Ambassadors in Beirut revive a dormant conciliation committee to conduct negotiations between the Phalange and Syria. The committee has at least nominal authority over the Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent Force. 

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Kuwaiti press reports suggest that the Foreign Ministers of Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait will meet in Riyadh on Sunday to discuss the crisis. Kuwaiti officials hope that the committee will provide a forum through which Syria can reach a compromise settlement. 

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Lebanese Prime Minister Wazzan indicated yesterday that his government welcomed the decision to revive the committee. Government, leftist, and Muslim political leaders also have been generally enthusiastic. Christian rightists, however, reacted negatively to the proposal. Camille Shamun, head of the Phalange-dominated Lebanese Front, complained that the conference failed to address the roots of the Lebanese problem and repeated his demand for withdrawal of Syrian forces. 

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WEST GERMANY: Bundestag Reaffirms TNF Commitment

The Bundestag's near unanimous reaffirmation on Tuesday of NATO's TNF modernization decision masks divisions within the Social Democratic Party but probably will strengthen Chancellor Schmidt's position in dealing with his opponents on the issue. [redacted]

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During the Bundestag debate on the coalition-sponsored TNF plank, which was supported by the opposition Christian Democrats, Schmidt emphasized that he is satisfied after visiting Washington that the US will consult with its allies and pursue arms control negotiations. Schmidt's observation that President Mitterrand supports the NATO decision evidently is designed to discourage Social Democratic leftwingers. [redacted]

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Only 11 deputies--all Social Democrats--refused to join the consensus. Many other Social Democratic deputies supported it only to preserve the coalition. The dissatisfaction of Social Democrats with the TNF decision was demonstrated by their enthusiastic reception of Willy Brandt's comments on the importance of detente to West Germany. [redacted]

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Despite the show of support by the party leadership, it remains divided on the issue within its own councils and is worried about the possible magnitude of grass-roots opposition in the party. Strong sentiment against the deployment decision is known to exist in the state organizations in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Saarland, South Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Bavaria. The leadership sees only the Rhineland-Palatinate organization as solidly behind them on TNF. [redacted]

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Grass-roots attitudes are of concern, because state organizations elect the delegates to the national congress, which routinely debates and sets party policy. TNF opponents are almost certain to propose a change in the party's position on TNF at the congress next April. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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TANZANIA-UGANDA: Impact of Troop Withdrawal

The return from Uganda of approximately 10,000 Tanzanian troops over the next month will lead to heightened security problems for President Nyerere. [Redacted]

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The withdrawal coincides with unprecedented domestic criticism of Nyerere's handling of the economy. It will reinforce disaffection among returning troops [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Tanzanian troops in Uganda profited from illegal moneymaking schemes, but at home they will face reduced rations, pay, and career prospects--factors that have already created widespread morale problems in the military. Senior officers also will be disgruntled with government plans to reduce the military's size and influence. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Troops returning to civilian status are unlikely to find work in the cities, where unemployment is over 20 percent. They have not received the high-paying civilian jobs they were promised on entering the military shortly before the invasion of Uganda. Many soldiers have smuggled arms from Uganda, which will add to security problems in urban areas, especially in Dar es Salaam. [Redacted]

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USSR: Internal Security Concerns

The unusual announcement of a national conference of KGB officials on Monday and Tuesday attended by President Brezhnev is another indication of the increased concern for internal security. Moscow's domestic line has been noticeably harder since the party ideological conference in late April, with military journals again publishing lurid accounts of successful Western efforts to recruit Soviet citizens. The focus on the need for vigilance almost certainly stems from concerns about increasingly tense East-West relations, the possible spread from Poland of the reform movement, and the impact of the worsening consumer economy at home.

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USSR: Disarmament Campaign

Moscow is promoting President Brezhnev's disarmament proposals with conventional diplomacy by using its allies in the West European Communist parties and by seeking to influence members of the Socialist International. Disarmament almost certainly was high on the agenda of Politburo member Romanov, who represented Moscow last weekend at the 19th Congress of the Finnish Communist Party, and Candidate Member Ponomarev, who will attend the congress of the West German Communist Party this week. Members of a Soviet delegation visiting West Germany are seeking to meet with Socialist International President Willy Brandt, and he reportedly has accepted an invitation to meet with Brezhnev early this summer. These conversations probably will focus upon Brezhnev's recent letter to member parties of the Socialist International, which elaborates on his disarmament proposals.

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
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ETHIOPIA: Seeking Western Economic Aid

Ethiopia needs substantially more financial help than the USSR is able or willing to provide. With export revenue down sharply because of declining coffee prices, Ethiopia is now faced with a record current account deficit for 1981. Moreover, Addis Ababa must meet increasing debt repayments to the USSR for the roughly \$2 billion in material received since 1977. Chairman Mengistu has arranged to borrow \$101 million from the IMF and is trying to obtain development funds from the World Bank. To facilitate negotiations, he is settling compensation claims by Western firms whose assets were confiscated following the revolution in 1974.



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Military Forces in Kampuchea

	Troop Strength	Weapons	Comments
Vietnam	180,000-200,000	Vast array of mostly Soviet-made weapons	Mostly unwilling draftees from the south led by northerners
People's Republic of Kampuchea	20,000	US- and Soviet-made equipment provided by Vietnamese	An ineffective force given little responsibility by the Vietnamese
Democratic Kampuchea	30,000-35,000	Well equipped with small arms supplied by China	Communists with strong leadership
Khmer People's National Liberation Front	3,000	Recently equipped with minor amount of Chinese small arms	Non-Communist with little contact with Vietnamese forces so far; lack guerrilla experience
Moulinaka	Over 500	Few small arms	Non-Communist, loyal to Sihanouk
Khmer Serei	Several thousand	Irregular supply of small arms	Non-Communist, organized into small groups; involved largely in cross-border smuggling operations



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[Redacted]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

KAMPUCHEA: No Solution in Sight

[Redacted]

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Two and a half years after Vietnam began its costly occupation of Kampuchea, Hanoi still shows no willingness to accept a negotiated solution. The Vietnamese leadership believes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will eventually acquiesce in its dominance in Phnom Penh and cease support to the resistance, and probably considers the economic dislocation, international isolation, and heavy dependence on the USSR caused by its occupation to be short-term expenses. In fact, military, political, and economic considerations make it unlikely that the costs to Hanoi will ease any time soon.

[Redacted]

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The Vietnamese could be hard pressed to retain control if they withdrew significant numbers of troops, and the puppet People's Republic of Kampuchea would collapse in a short time without Vietnam's backing. There is no sign that the Chinese--the main source of supply for the resistance--intend to scale down their support effort. The Kampuchean economy remains in shambles and dependent on external assistance for its survival.

[Redacted]

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The Military Situation

Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean forces, while unable to gain control of large chunks of territory or major towns, have proved impossible to eradicate. Over the past year or so, they have shown increasing strength. In addition to harassing Vietnamese positions in northern and western Kampuchea, they also have begun limited operations in the east and southeast.

[Redacted]

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Some Vietnamese units have suffered substantial losses and high desertions, forcing Hanoi to move in approximately 10,000 additional troops. Vietnamese forces remain in defensive positions, and major offensives are unlikely in the coming rainy season.

[Redacted]

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The resistance, however, is not likely soon to grow strong enough to drive out the Vietnamese. Only Pol Pot leads a viable military force, and his unpopularity among Kampuchians precludes any significant recruiting effort. Moreover, that unpopularity has so far prevented any real cooperation with other resistance groups in Kampuchea.

[Redacted]

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A United Front

China and the ASEAN countries are pushing the resistance groups to form a united front against the Vietnamese, but prospects for its formation are only fair. Pol Pot and exiled Prince Sihanouk say they are willing to form an alliance, but Son Sann, leader of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, has posed conditions for joining that could prevent its formation. Son Sann wants to remain a credible independent force available to form a neutralist regime should Vietnam be forced to negotiate a settlement.

[Redacted]

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Son Sann's group is more popular than the Democratic Kampuchians in refugee camps, but few see Son Sann as the leader of a strong, effective military movement. Most Kampuchians apparently believe that he would eventually be overpowered in any alliance with the Democratic Kampuchians.

[Redacted]

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In any case, such a coalition would only marginally help the military resistance and, with the major participants intensely hostile to each other, would be unlikely to endure. The replacement of most current Democratic Kampuchea officials by people with wider appeal, however, would make the regime more acceptable internationally.

[Redacted]

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There are other non-Communist forces, but they are small, disorganized groups with more experience in black market operations than guerrilla warfare.

[Redacted]

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Prospects

At least in the near term, we do not see resistance of any form developing to the point where the Vietnamese

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would be forced to retreat from their goal of controlling all of Kampuchea. As long as they continue to receive Soviet economic and military assistance, the Vietnamese can continue to bear the cost of military occupation. The situation in Kampuchea itself would be only one of a variety of factors that would produce a Vietnamese change of heart--in the unlikely event that one were to occur. [Redacted]

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